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Abstract We consider the problem of sharing the cost of a network that meets the
connection demands of a set of agents. The agents simultaneously choose paths in
the network connecting their demand nodes. A mechanism splits the total cost of the
network formed among the participants. We introduce two new properties of imple-
mentation. The first property, Pareto Nash implementation (PNI), requires that the
efficient outcome always be implemented in a Nash equilibrium and that the efficient
outcome Pareto dominates any other Nash equilibrium. The average cost mechanism
and other asymmetric variations are the only mechanisms that meet PNI. These mecha-
nisms are also characterized under strong Nash implementation. The second property,
weakly Pareto Nash implementation (WPNI), requires that the least inefficient equi-
librium Pareto dominates any other equilibrium. The egalitarian mechanism (EG) and
other asymmetric variations are the only mechanisms that meet WPNI and individ-
ual rationality. EG minimizes the price of stability across all individually rational
mechanisms.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Network cost-sharing problem
We consider the problem of sharing the cost of a congestion-free network that meets
the connection demands of a set of agents. A network may represent the network of
roads, Internet network or telecommunication network, where each link has a cost.
The cost of a link may refer to the maintenance cost of a road segment, construction
cost of a connection link between servers, etc. The agents simultaneously choose paths
in the network to connect their unique sources to their unique sinks, and the choice of
paths of all the agents leads to the network that must be constructed and/or maintained.
A mechanism splits the total cost of the network formed among the participants. We
focus on the case where agents only care about being connected at the minimal cost.1
This type of problem is well studied in the literature (see Anshelevich et al. 2004;
Chen et al. 2008; Epstein et al. 2007, 2009; Fiat et al. 2006 and other papers below)
and arises in many contexts ranging from water distribution systems, road networks,
telecommunications services, and multicast transmission to large computer networks
such as the Internet.
A challenge to designing mechanisms arises because a mechanism induces a game
among the agents who choose their paths strategically. Therefore, the traditional objec-
tives of the social planner may be conflicting, and thus, it may not be obvious to choose
one mechanism over the other. We focus on mechanisms that are efficient, that is, the
ones that minimize the cost of the network formed at the equilibrium of the game
when the agents choose their paths strategically.2 In other words, the planner wants to
design a mechanism that implements the efficient graph.
Consider the network in Fig. 1 with two agents located at the common source s
and interested in going to the sinks t1 and t2, respectively. The Shapley mechanism
(Sh, Chen et al. 2008), which divides the cost of every edge equally across its users,
may provide the wrong incentives to the players and they may end up choosing an
inefficient graph at equilibrium. Indeed, if c3 < c2 < c1, then the efficient graph is
formed by the links st2 and t2t1, agent 1 chooses the path (st2t1) and agent 2 chooses
the path (st2). However, at equilibrium, agent 1 does not choose the efficient path
whenever c22 + c3 > c1. In general networks, even the best equilibrium of the Sh can
be as costly as H(k) = 1 + 12 + · · · + 1k times the cost of the optimal graph, where
1 This framework can be considered as a benchmark to more general problems where agents get different
utility from the path choice, for instance, links facing congestion and idiosyncratic intensities of use of a
link/path by agents, among others.
2 Here efficient outcome is the outcome that maximizes the sum of utilities of the agents. In our framework,
this is equivalent to the outcome that minimizes the sum of costs, that is, the cost of the network fulfilling
all the connection demands. This notion of efficiency is different from other optimality notions studied in
the literature, such as Myerson (1981), Ulku (2012).
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Fig. 1 Network with two agents
at the common source s and two
different sinks t1 and t2
k is the number of users (Anshelevich et al. 2004). Therefore, there is a need to find
mechanisms that implement the efficient graph.
1.2 Robust efficient implementation
The celebrated literature on full implementation of the efficient outcome has more
often than not hit impossibilities (see Maskin and Sjostrom 2002 for a comprehensive
survey). In the growing literature in computer science (and more recently in eco-
nomics3), two measures of efficiency loss have been very fruitfully studied. On the
one hand, there is the traditional price of anarchy (PoA, Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou
1999), which computes the ratio of the worst equilibrium over the efficient outcome.
On the other hand, there is the price of stability (PoS, Anshelevich et al. 2004), which
computes the ratio of the best equilibrium over the efficient outcome. Both of these
measures have been very effective in selecting second-best mechanisms. However,
these approaches lack economic justification and thus seem to be quite arbitrary in
the absence of a compelling equilibrium selection rule. The following types of natural
questions automatically arise. Why should we study the worst case performance of a
mechanism? Why not the best case scenario?
In this paper, we fill this gap by providing new equilibrium selection rules. We intro-
duce two new properties of implementation.4 The first property, Pareto Nash imple-
mentation (PNI), requires that the efficient outcome always be implemented in a Nash
equilibrium (NE) and that the efficient outcome Pareto dominates any other NE. Con-
trary to the traditional literature on full implementation, PNI may implement multiple
3 See for instance Moulin (2008) for a comparison of three cost-sharing mechanisms using the price of
anarchy. See Juarez (2008) for a comparison of two mechanisms in the problem of commons using the
worst-absolute surplus loss.
4 Notice that the problem of implementation we consider here differs from the one considered in the
traditional literature since there is no private information on the part of agents. However, it is the same
problem in the sense that the planner has an objective function (here efficiency) and the cost-sharing
mechanism induces a game whose equilibrium is the outcome obtained.
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inefficient equilibria; however, the efficient equilibrium is always implemented and
Pareto dominates any other equilibrium.
The second property, weakly Pareto Nash implementation (WPNI), requires that the
least inefficient equilibrium Pareto dominates any other equilibrium. That is, WPNI
might implement several equilibria (and all of them might be inefficient), but the least
inefficient equilibrium should be preferred by all the agents to any other equilibrium.
Thus, if the NE is a good predictor of the outcome implemented by the mechanism,
the least inefficient equilibrium stands out as a reasonable selection.5
PNI and WPNI suggest implementation with equilibrium selection rather than arbi-
trarily choosing the best or the worst equilibria as the benchmark to measure the per-
formance of a mechanism. Either the efficient equilibrium is implemented under PNI,
or the least inefficient is implemented under WPNI. Therefore, PNI and WPNI point
out a class of environments where the PoS, or any other measure of inefficiency that
uses the best equilibrium as a benchmark, can be justified.6
1.3 Minimal information setting
We study the problem of designing mechanisms when the information available to the
designer is minimal. Specifically, we focus on the case where the mechanism splits
the total cost of the network formed by using only the costs of the paths demanded by
the agents and the total cost of the network formed.
This setting has multiple applications. For instance, consider the network of roads in
a state, district, or country to be financed by the users of the roads. The procurement of
information on the exact paths used by drivers requires the compulsory installment of
GPS (global positioning system) in all vehicles and the data to be stored and updated by
a central taxing authority. Because of privacy issues, this may not be possible politically
(see, for example, Ryan 2012). However, a tax based on the number of miles driven can
be implemented without raising such privacy concerns. Road maintenance taxes based
on the miles driven by every user have been used in pilot programs in Oregon since
January 2009, and other states such as Ohio, Pennsylvania, Colorado, Florida, Rhode
Island, Minnesota, and Texas are considering them (see AP 2009a,b; Patterson 2011;
Galbraith 2009). In this setting, all the information that the designer (government)
has is (a) the roads that are used more frequently (from the traffic data or the data on
maintenance requirements) and (b) the miles driven by each vehicle. The maintenance
of these roads must be financed by the tax collected from the drivers. This kind of
5 Apart from the property of being immune to unilateral deviation, the Pareto optimal NE is also immune
to deviation by the grand coalition. Also, pre-play communication leads to the payoff-dominant Pareto
optimal NE in many games. See for instance Calcagno and Lovo (2010), Cooper et al. (1992), Kim (1996).
6 Note that contrary to PNI, WPNI may not implement the best possible outcome. The definition of WPNI
does not rule out the existence of another mechanism whose equilibria (possibly not Pareto ranked) are less
inefficient than the equilibria of a WPNI mechanism. However, in our model, as we will see in the results,
the mechanisms characterized under WPNI are less inefficient than any possible mechanism that satisfies
individual rationality.
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environment requires mechanisms where the input is the total cost of the paths7 used
by the agents rather than the paths themselves.
Moreover, in spite of the information on the paths being available, it may sometimes
be desirable to use just the total costs of the paths rather than the paths themselves.
Consider, for instance, a big or highly dynamic network structure, where agents join
and leave the network continuously. It may be impractical to change the formulae of
our mechanism every time the network changes. One such example is sharing the cost
of a telephone network or the Internet where the agreement is generally monthly but
there are agents entering and leaving the network continuously. Notice that charging
the same amount for long distance calls makes sense irrespective of the number of
users who share the edges.8 Alternative examples include the fare charged by a taxi
(which usually depends only on the distance driven) or the division of a joint electricity
bill in condominiums. There are normative concerns too for penalizing agents who
may not be responsible for the fact that their links are not shared by a lot of users.
Examples include electricity/water supply or postal service to remote villages. There is
a reasonable case against charging higher prices for these services to the poor villagers
living in a small village on the top of a mountain.
This setup has a natural resemblance to the classic rationing problem (also referred
to in the literature as a bankruptcy, taxation, or claims problem), where a given amount
of a resource (e.g., money) must be divided among beneficiaries with unequal claims
on the resource (see Moulin 2002; Thomson 2003 and below for related work).
1.4 Overview of the results
Theorem 1 characterizes the class of mechanisms that satisfy PNI. The mechanisms
are monotonic in the total cost and do not depend on the demands of the agents. The
average cost mechanism (AC) (Moulin and Shenker 2001; Juarez 2008, which divides
the total cost of the network equally among its participants (Theorem 2), is the only
symmetric mechanism in this class. These mechanisms are also characterized under
strong Nash implementation, which requires the efficient equilibrium to be a strong
NE.
The main downside of AC and the above variations is that they do not meet individ-
ual rationality (IR, also referred to in the literature as voluntary participation): agents
demanding cheap links may pay more than the cost of their demands; thus, they may
subsidize agents who demand expensive links. We provide a class of mechanisms that
meet both IR and WPNI. The egalitarian mechanism (EG, Sprumont 1982), a sym-
metric mechanism reminiscent of AC that meets IR, also satisfies WPNI. Theorem 3
introduces a new class of mechanisms that are non-symmetric variations of EG. Such
mechanisms are the only mechanisms that meet WPNI.
7 In this example, the cost of a link in the network is proportional to the distance between the nodes that
this link connects.
8 The choice of path is not a strategy for the telephone user, and thus, the setting is not exactly the same.
But, the cost-sharing mechanism has a similar motivation; namely, it is simpler than charging every caller
differently based on the path used.
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We show that EG has a PoS equal to H(k) = 1+ 12 +· · ·+ 1k , where k is the number
of agents in the network. EG is also an optimum across all mechanisms meeting IR
under the PoS measure.9
1.5 Related literature
The literature on connection networks has mainly focused on the performance of the
Sh. For example, Chen et al. (2008) studies the equilibrium behavior of separable
mechanisms. The PoS of separable mechanisms with a linear cost-sharing function is
at least H(k) (which is O(log k)), where k is the number of agents (Chen et al. 2008).
The number H(k) is also the upper bound on PoS(Sh) in general graphs (Anshelevich
et al. 2004). This upper bound is achieved in directed graphs. If the graph is undirected,
PoS(Sh) is lower than H(k). Fiat et al. (2006) finds a new upper bound of O(log log k)
when the graph is single source and there are no Steiner nodes. Li (2009) finds a new
upper bound of O(log k/ log log k) for single source networks when Steiner nodes are
allowed. Chen et al. (2008) shows that the upper bound in a two player case with a
single source is 43 . Kumar (2010) finds that 43 is also the upper bound in a general
multi-commodity case. Epstein et al. (2009) investigates the conditions on network
topologies that admit a strong equilibrium under Sh and finds the upper bound on
strong PoA (Andelman et al. 2009) under Sh to be H(k). Hougaard and Tvede (2012)
considers a problem similar to ours where the designer’s objective is to implement
the minimum cost spanning tree but the private information about the link costs is not
known to the designer. They characterize the set of cost-sharing mechanisms under
which true revelation of link costs is a NE.
The paper also connects to the literature on the rationing problem (also referred
to as bankruptcy, taxation, or claims problem). This literature was started by O’Neill
(1982), Aumann and Maschler (1985) and nicely surveyed by Moulin (2002), Thomson
(2003). The class of asymmetric parametric rules plays a key role in Theorem 3.
Young (1987) characterizes the class of symmetric parametric rules by consistency
in the population of agents, continuity and symmetry. This class is extended to richer
settings by Kaminski (2006). The axiom of consistency, which is the key component
of the parametric rules, has been extensively explored in the literature. See Dagan and
Volij (1997), Kaminski (2000), Thomson (2007) for characterizations of the rules that
are consistent. Moulin (2000), Chambers (2006), Thomson (2003), Moulin (2002),
Young (1988) provide important collections of consistent rules.
2 The model
We denote the set of agents by K¯ = {1, 2, . . . , k}. A network cost-sharing prob-
lem is a tuple N = 〈G, K 〉, where G = (V, E) is a network that is directed
or undirected such that each edge e ∈ E has a nonnegative cost ce. The set
9 The Shapley mechanism even though it looks like a natural mechanism in this setting, fails basic tests
such as efficiency, symmetry at equilibrium and continuity. It also does not satisfy minimal information,
since the cost-share of an agent depends on the number of users of his demanded links.
123
Implementing efficient graphs in connection networks
K = ((s1, t1), (s2, t2), . . . , (sk, tk)), where (si , ti ) ∈ V × V for all i ∈ K¯ , repre-
sents the sources and sinks that agents want to connect. When there is no confusion,
we also denote K = K¯ as the set of agents. Let the set of all graphs be G, and the set
of all network cost-sharing problems be denoted by N.
Given a problem N ∈ N, a strategy10 for agent i is a path Pi ⊆ E that connects si to
ti . Let the set of paths connecting si to ti be Πi (N ). Let Π(N ) ≡ ×i∈K Πi (N ) be the set
of strategy profiles of all agents in network N . The vector P = (P1, . . . , Pk) ∈ Π(N )
will be used to denote a strategy profile of the agents. When there is no confusion we
denoteΠi (N ) andΠ(N ) simply asΠi andΠ , respectively. Let G P = (V,⋃i∈K¯ Pi )be
the network formed by the choice of paths by different agents. Let C(P) = ∑e∈G P ce
be the cost of the graph formed by strategies P.
Let N = {(P, N )|P ∈ Π(N ), N ∈ N} be the union of all problems with their
respective strategies.
Definition 1 A cost-sharing mechanism is a continuous11 mapping ϕ : N → Rk+
such that
∑
i∈K
ϕi (P, N ) = C(P) for all (P, N ) ∈ N .
A cost-sharing mechanism assigns nonnegative cost-shares to the users of the net-
work based on their demands such that the total cost of the network formed is exactly
collected.
Continuity in the mechanism, which at first looks harmless, plays a key role in the
proofs.12 Continuity captures the fact that small perturbations on the demand or cost
of the network should not change the total allocation of the cost.
Example 1 – The Sh, divides the cost of every link equally across its users. That is,
Shi (P, N ) = ∑e∈Pi ceU (e,P) for all i ∈ K¯ , where U (e, P) is the number of users
of link e in the strategy profile P.
– The proportional to the stand-alone mechanism, ηpr , divides the cost of the
network in proportion to every user’s stand-alone cost. That is, ηpri (P, N ) =
S Ai (N )
S A1(N )+···+S Ak (N )C(P) for all i ∈ K¯ , where S Ai (N ) = minPi ∈Πi (N ) C(Pi ) is the
stand-alone cost of agent i in network N .
– The AC, divides the cost of the network formed equally across all users. That is,
ACi (P, N ) = C(P)k for all i ∈ K¯ .
The Sh is a separable mechanism, that is, it divides the cost of every link only across
its users and adds those costs for all links in the network formed. Alternative separable
mechanisms can be constructed by considering different cost-sharing rules for the
links, for instance, by giving priority across users. Nevertheless, Sh is the optimal
10 We use the word strategy to be consistent with the game that will be defined in Sect. 2.1.
11 Continuous with the Euclidean distance as a function of the costs in the network.
12 It is particularly crucial in the proofs of the key Separability Lemma (Lemma 4) and the proofs of
Theorems 1 and 2.
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mechanism (using the PoS measure; see below) across all separable mechanisms (Chen
et al. 2008). Sh can be computed in polynomial time.
On the other hand, ηpr divides the cost of the network in proportion to the stand-
alone cost of the agents. Since the stand-alone cost of every agent has to be computed
for every network, this mechanism uses the full information of the network.
AC divides the cost of the network formed equally across the users of the network.
It is the most EG, reminiscent of the classic head tax rule, where the size of agents’
demands is not relevant; only the size of the total cost of the network formed is relevant.
AC uses less information than Sh or ηpr , since only the total cost of the network formed
and the number of agents are needed to compute the cost-sharing allocation. There is
no need to know the stand-alone cost of the agents or the users of certain links. As a
result, its computation complexity is minimal.
To contrast the allocation of the three mechanisms, consider the network in Fig. 1,
where c1 = 2, c2 = 1 and c3 = 1. Assume that the demand of agent 1 is st2t1
and the demand of agent 2 is st2. The Sh splits the cost of link st2 equally among
agents; therefore, it allocates payments Sh1 = 12 + 1 and Sh2 = 12 . The stand-alone
cost of agent 1 equals 2, and the stand-alone cost of agent 2 equals 1. Therefore, the
proportional to the stand-alone mechanism allocates payments ηpr1 = 23 (2) = 43 and
η
pr
2 = 13 (2) = 23 . Finally, the AC splits the cost equally; therefore, AC1 = AC2 = 1.
Definition 2 A cost-sharing mechanism ϕ uses minimal information if for any two
problems N = 〈G, K 〉 and N ′ = 〈G ′, K ′〉 and strategies P ∈ Π(N ) and P ′ ∈ Π(N ′)
such that C(Pi ) = C(P ′i ) for all i ∈ K¯ and C(P) = C(P ′): ϕ(P, N ) = ϕ(P ′, N ′).
Minimal information captures the mechanisms that depend only on the cost of
the network formed and the cost of the agents’ demands. For instance, in Fig. 2, we
represent three different networks formed by the demands of three agents. The first
coordinate represents the cost of the network formed. The second, third, and fourth
coordinates represent the cost of the demands of agents 1, 2, and 3, respectively.
A cost-sharing mechanism that uses minimal information would allocate the same
payments to the agents in all three problems if the following four conditions hold: (i)
the total cost of the network formed does not vary across problems (w + x + y + z =
p + q + r + s = a + b + c + d + e); (ii) the cost of the demand of agent 1 does not
Fig. 2 Equivalence in cost-shares under minimal information
123
Implementing efficient graphs in connection networks
vary across problems (w + x = q = a + d); (iii) the cost of the demand of agent 2
does not vary across problems (w + y = r + s = b + c + d); and (iv) the cost of the
demand of agent 3 does not vary across problems (w + z = s + p = b + e).
Neither Sh nor ηpr uses minimal information. On the other hand, AC uses only
the total cost of the network formed and the number of users; thus, it uses minimal
information. More complex mechanisms that use minimal information are discussed
in the following sections.
All the mechanisms studied in this paper use minimal information. Minimal infor-
mation is always assumed and we do not refer to it when there is no confusion.
Let Sk = {(c; y) ∈ R+ × Rk+| maxi yi ≤ c ≤
∑
i yi }.
Lemma 1 A cost-sharing mechanism ϕ uses minimal information if and only if there
is a continuous function ξ : Sk → Rk+ such that
∑
i ξi (c; y) = c for all (c; y) ∈ Sk,
and
ϕ(P, N ) = ξ(C(P); C(P1), . . . , C(Pk))
for all problems (P, N ) ∈ N .
Proof The sufficiency part is obvious. We prove the necessity only.
First, for any (c; y) ∈ Sk , we construct the network N˜ (c; y) as follows. Assume
without loss of generality that y1 ≥ y2 ≥ · · · ≥ yk . Choose i, where i ∈ {1, . . . k},
such that
y1 + y2 + · · · + yi ≤ c < y1 + y2 + · · · + yi+1.
Let N˜ (c; y) be a linear network such that every agent has a unique strategy (see
Fig. 3). In this Figure, the source node of agent 1 is also the source node of agent
i + 2, agent i + 3, …, agent k (the first node on the left). The sink node of agent m is
also the source node of agent m + 1 for all m = 1, 2, . . . , i − 1. Agents 1 to i have
demands that do not overlap. Agent i + 1 has demand yi+1 such that a segment of
length c − (y1 + y2 + · · · + yi ) does not intersect the demand of other agents, and
Fig. 3 Linear network where all the agents have exactly one strategy and the total cost of the network
equals c
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y1 + y2 +· · ·+ yi+1 −c intersects the demand of agent i . Agent j, such that j > i +1,
has demand y j that is contained in the demand of agent 1.
Clearly, the unique strategy of agent k in N˜ (c; y) is yk, and the network formed by
all strategies has cost c. Define ξ : Sk → Rk+ as ξ(c; y) = ϕ(N˜ (c; y)).
Second, consider any arbitrary network N = 〈G, K 〉 and a set of demands P. On
the one hand, notice that C(P) ≥ C(Pi ) for every agent i, since Pi ⊆ P. On the other
hand, notice that C(P) ≤ C(P1) + · · · + C(Pk), since P ⊆ P1 ∪ P2 ∪ · · · ∪ Pk .
Let yi = C(Pi ) and c = C(P). Then, (c; y) ∈ Sk . By minimal information
ϕ(P, N ) = ϕ(N˜ (c; y)) = ξ(c; y).
Finally, the continuity of ξ follows from the continuity of ϕ. unionsq
Notice that a mechanism that uses minimal information can be expressed as a
function ξ that is similar to a rationing rule (Thomson 2003; Moulin 2002). Since we
work only with mechanisms that use minimal information, we often refer without loss
of generality to the rule ξ as a mechanism. When there is no confusion, the total cost
of a path demanded by an agent will be referred to as his demand.
Example 2 In this example, we see that the network plays a very critical role in the
implementation problem of mechanisms that use minimal information. In particular,
we see that for the same network, the same total cost and demand may correspond to
different equilibria.
Consider the networks in Fig. 2 (left and right). Assume that the following four
conditions are satisfied (i) w + x + y + z = a + b + c + d + e, (ii) w + x = a + d,
(iii) w + y = b + c + d, and (iv) w + z = b + e. Thus, any mechanism that uses
minimal information allocates the same payments at the given demands.
The demand profile in Fig. 2 (left) will always be an equilibrium in any minimal
information mechanism. The reason is that there are no other alternatives to the players.
However, when we consider the third network in Fig. 2 (right), the same demand profile
will not be an equilibrium for the AC mechanism for any positive c. Players 1 and 2
have profitable deviations to path be from paths ad and bcd, respectively.
Therefore, the equilibria do depend on the network chosen.
2.1 Efficiency and other desirable properties
Since we focus only on minimal information mechanisms, all the desirable properties
that we require are imposed in the function ξ given by Lemma 1.
Given a problem N = 〈G, K 〉, we say P∗ is an efficient graph if P∗ ∈
arg minP∈Π(N )C(P). That is, P∗ is a graph that connects all the agents at a mini-
mal cost. Let Eff(N ) be the set of efficient graphs in the problem N .
Given the problem N = 〈G, K 〉, the mechanism ξ induces the following non-
cooperative game Γ ξ (N ) ≡ 〈K¯ , {Πi (N )}i∈K¯ , {ξi }i∈K¯ 〉, where the representation of
the game is the standard representation of the game in normal form. Namely, K¯ =
{1, . . . , k} is the set of players, Πi (N ) is the strategy space of player i , and ξi is the
(negative of) payoff function of player i that maps a strategy profile to real numbers.
P is a NE of Γ ξ (N ) if Pi ∈ arg min
P´i ∈Πi (N )
ξi (P´i , P−i ) for all i.
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Let N E(Γ ξ (N )) ≡ {P ∈ Π(N )|P is a NE of Γ ξ (N )} be the set of Nash equilibria
of the game Γ ξ (N ).
Since every agent in the game Γ ξ (N ) has a finite number of strategies, the game
has a finite number of equilibria or there is no equilibrium.
We say that ξ (weakly) implements P if P ∈ N E(Γ ξ (N )).
Definition 3 The mechanism ξ is efficient (EFF) if it implements an efficient graph
for any problem N , that is, P∗ ∈ N E(Γ ξ (N )) for some efficient graph P∗.13
The definition of efficiency just requires an efficient graph to be a NE. This does
not preclude the existence of other inefficient equilibria.
Notice that AC is efficient. Indeed, at any efficient strategy profile P∗, every agent
is paying C(P
∗)
k . If an agent i deviates from P
∗ by reporting Pi , then he will pay
C(Pi ,P∗−i )
k . Clearly,
C(Pi ,P∗−i )
k ≥ C(P
∗)
k by the optimality of P
∗
.
Section 4 discusses a variety of mechanisms that are not efficient.
For the vectors z, z˜ ∈ Rm, we say z ≤ z˜ if zi ≤ z˜i for all i.
Definition 4 The mechanism ξ Pareto Nash implements (PNI) an efficient graph if
for any problem N , it implements an efficient graph and that graph Pareto dominates
any other equilibrium, that is, for any problem N
– there is an efficient graph P∗ such that P∗ ∈ N E(Γ ξ (N )), and
– ξ(P∗) ≤ ξ(P) for any other P ∈ N E(Γ ξ (N )).
PNI is a very robust property that provides agents with the incentives to select
the efficient allocation even when a multiplicity of equilibria arise. In the case of a
multiplicity of equilibria, PNI requires that all agents would prefer the efficient graph to
any other equilibrium. Hence, under a multiplicity of equilibria, it serves as a selection
rule.
In particular, this implies that whenever there is a multiplicity of equilibria such
that agent i prefers equilibrium Pi to P j and agent j prefers equilibrium P j to Pi ,
there should exist another equilibrium P∗ (the efficient equilibrium) such that agent i
prefers equilibrium P∗ to Pi and agent j also prefers equilibrium P∗ to P j .
The AC mechanism PNI the efficient graph. Indeed, at the efficient graph P∗, this
equilibrium would Pareto dominate any other equilibrium P˜ since C(P
∗)
k ≤ C(P˜)k .14
Another point in favor of AC (and its asymmetric variations discussed below) is that
it generates an ordinal potential game on the set of players where the potential function
is equal to the total cost. Since the vast family of decentralized learning/tatonnement
mechanisms converge to a NE in a potential game,15 they will also do so in the AC
13 The reader should not confuse this definition with other definitions of efficiency irrespective of incentive-
compatibility considerations.
14 Note that this property and some others discussed in this section are true not just for the network cost-
sharing problems but also for other cost-sharing problems. However, as we will see soon, in the network
cost-sharing framework, this property together with symmetry characterizes the AC mechanism. Indeed,
all our major characterization results use networks in an essential sense.
15 See Monderer and Shapley (1996a,b) for convergence of fictitious play and best response (br) dynamics.
See Sandholm (2001) for more general dynamics.
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mechanism. Moreover, with the presence of a non-binding coordinator (who knows
the optimal path in advance), the agents can easily converge to the best NE.
Definition 5 The mechanism ξ strongly Nash implements (SNI) an efficient graph if
for any problem N it implements an efficient graph in a strong NE, that is, for any
problem N
– there is an efficient graph P∗ such that P∗ ∈ N E(Γ ξ (N )), and
– for any group of agents S ⊂ {1, . . . , k}, and P ∈ Π(N ) such that P−S = P∗−S, if
ξi (P) < ξi (P∗) for some i ∈ S, then ξ j (P) > ξ j (P∗) for some j ∈ S.
Under SNI, there is no group of agents that can coordinate paths and weakly improve
all of them, and at least one agent in the group strictly improves. This is related to
the strong NE16 and to the literature on group strategyproofness (Juarez 2012; Moulin
1999).
The AC mechanism SNI the efficient graph. Indeed, at any deviation P˜S of the group
of agent S from the efficient graph P∗, it should be the case that C(P
∗)
k ≤
C(P˜S ,P∗N\S)
k
for all i ∈ S. Hence, no agent in S would strictly improve by deviating.
Definition 6 – The mechanism ξ that uses minimal information is demand
monotonic (DM) if for all feasible problems (c; y), (c; y˜) ∈ Sk such that
y−i = y˜−i and yi < y˜i : ξi (c; y) ≤ ξi (c; y˜).
– The mechanism ξ that uses minimal information is strongly demand monotonic
(SDM) if for all feasible problems (c; y), (c; y˜) ∈ Sk such that y−i = y˜−i and
yi < y˜i : ξ−i (c; y) ≥ ξ−i (c; y˜).
Demand monotonicity is a weak property that requires that whenever the demand
of an agent increases, everything else fixed, his payment should not decrease. Notice
that does not preclude the possibility that the payment of other agents would change.
Under SDM, the increase in the demand of one agent does not increase the payment
of other agents. In particular, notice that SDM implies DM since all of the agents’
payments have to add up to a constant.
AC is clearly SDM since AC(c; y) = AC(c; y˜). Thus an increase in the demand
of one agent does not change the payments of the other agents.
3 Implementing the efficient equilibrium
We now turn to the first main result of the paper. We characterize the mechanisms that
meet the efficiency properties discussed above.
Theorem 1 Assume that there are three or more agents. Then, the following four
statements are equivalent for a mechanism ξ that uses minimal information:
1. the mechanism ξ is EFF and SDM;
2. the mechanism ξ PNI the efficient graph;
16 SNI is more demanding than the original strong NE (Aumann 1959) that requires strict improvements
by all agents involved in the deviation.
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3. the mechanism ξ SNI the efficient graph;
4. there is a monotonic function f : R+ → Rk+ such that
∑
i fi (c) = c and ξ(c; y) =
f (c) for any feasible problem (c; y).
The mechanisms characterized by Theorem 1 are demand independent, that is, the
cost-share of every agent does not depend on whether the agents are demanding cheap
or expensive links. Instead, they depend only on the total cost of the network formed.
The AC, generated by f (c) = ( ck , . . . , ck ), is the only mechanism in this class that
treats equal agents equally.
Notice that efficiency alone is not sufficient to characterize the above mechanisms.
Indeed, consider the mechanism
ξ˜ (c; y) =
(
min
{
y3,
c
k
}
,
2c
k
− min
{
y3,
c
k
}
,
c
k
, . . . ,
c
k
)
.
First, notice that ξ˜ implements the efficient graph because at the efficient graph
agents {3, . . . , k} do not have the incentive to deviate since by doing so their payment
is going to increase. On the other hand, agents {1, 2}do not have any incentive to deviate
from the efficient equilibrium since the functions min{y3, ck } and 2ck − min{y3, ck } are
weakly monotonic in the total cost of the network and do not depend on their report.
The mechanism ξ˜ is also an example of a mechanism that is not SNI, but agents
cannot strictly improve by coordinating. To see that ξ does not SNI the efficient graph,
notice that in the problems where agent 3 has multiple strategies leading to the same
efficient cost c, he can help either agent 1 or agent 2 without having his own payoff
changed.
Minimal information is crucial to get this result. The proportional to the stand-alone
mechanism ηpr PNI and SNI the efficient graph. However, ηpr does not use minimal
information.
3.1 Efficient mechanisms for two agents
The example above shows that for three or more agents, EFF is not enough to char-
acterize the demand-independent mechanisms. On the other hand, this property is
enough when there are two agents. The property is an immediate consequence of a
Separability Lemma described below.
Proposition 1 Assume that there are two agents. A mechanism that uses minimal
information is efficient if and only if there is a monotonic function f : R+ → R2+
such that f1(c) + f2(c) = c and ξ(c; y) = f (c) for any feasible problem (c; y).
3.2 Equal treatment of equals
Definition 7 The mechanism ξ that uses minimal information satisfies equal treatment
of equals (ETE) if ξi (c; y) = ξ j (c; y) for any agents i and j , and any feasible problem
(c; y) such that yi = y j .
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ETE is the standard property of equal responsibility for the cost of the good. Equal
agents with the same demand should be allocated the same cost. There is a large class
of solutions that meet ETE. In Sect. 4, we describe alternative mechanisms that meet
ETE, such as the proportional and the egalitarian solution.
Theorem 2 A mechanism that uses minimal information is EFF and ETE if and only
if it is AC.
Notice that this statement is not directly implied by Theorem 1, since we do not
need SDM.
4 Individually rational mechanisms
Definition 8 A mechanism ξ that uses minimal information is individually rational
(IR) if ξi (c; y) ≤ yi for any feasible problem (c; y) and any agent i .
Individually rational mechanisms rule out cross-subsidies, that is, no agent pays
more than the cost of his demand.
Notice that neither AC nor any mechanism discussed in Theorem 1 meets individual
rationality. Therefore, the traditional incompatibility of strategyproofness, efficiency,
budget balance, and individual rationality (Green and Laffont 1979) also holds in this
problem.
This incompatibility holds only because we consider mechanisms that use mini-
mal information. If we remove this constraint, there is a large class of mechanisms
that always implement the efficient network and at the same time meet individual
rationality. For instance, consider the proportional to the stand-alone mechanism ηpr
discussed above. ηpr is IR because no agent pays more than his stand-alone cost,
which in turn is less than his demand. On the other hand, ηpr implements the efficient
allocation because the cost-share of every agent is in proportion to the cost of the
network; therefore, any deviation from the efficient graph that increases the total cost
of the network formed would increase the cost-share of all agents.
On the other hand, there is a large class of IR mechanisms that use minimal infor-
mation: most of the mechanisms discussed in the rationing/bankruptcy literature meet
IR; see, for instance, Thomson (2003), Moulin (2002).
A class of rationing mechanisms that is especially compelling is derived from the
class of asymmetric parametric rules.
Definition 9 For every agent i, consider Fi : [0,Λ] × R+ → R+, continuous in
both variables, non-decreasing in the first variable and such that Fi (0, z) = 0 and
Fi (Λ, z) = z for all z. A parametric rationing mechanism is defined as.17
ϕi (c; y) = Fi (λ∗, yi ) where λ∗ solves
∑
i∈K¯
Fi (λ∗, yi ) = c
17 Notice that there could be more than one solution λ∗ to the system; however, they will give the same
cost-shares to the agents.
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Fig. 4 Contrast between AC, EG and PR for two agents
The class of parametric rationing mechanisms is very rich since it contains almost
any rationing rule discussed in the literature.18 In particular, it contains two basic
rationing mechanisms: proportional and egalitarian. The proportional mechanism (PR)
divides the cost of the agents in proportion to their demands, that is,
P Ri (c; y) = yiy1 + · · · + yk c.
On the other hand, the EG divides the cost equally across the agents subject to no
agent paying more than his demand, that is,
EGi (c; y) = min{yi , λ∗} whereλ∗ solves
∑
i
min{yi , λ∗} = c.
The parametric description of these two mechanisms is given by
Proportional : Fi (λ, z) = λz,Λ = 1;
Egalitarian :Fi (λ, z) = min{λ, z},Λ = ∞.
Figure 4 illustrates the allocation of payments for AC and EG at the problem
(c; y1, y2). In both figures, AC would allocate a payment equal to c2 to every agent.
In Fig. 4 left, both agents have a demand above the average cost c2 . Therefore, EG
coincides with AC and allocates a payment of c2 to every agent. On the other hand,
in Fig. 4 right, agent 1 demands less than the average cost c2 . Therefore, his payment
under EG would be equal to his demand y1, whereas agent 2 would pay the difference
to cover the cost c − y1. The PR allocates the point of intersection of the simplex with
the line joining the origin and the demand vector.
We now introduce a class of mechanisms that generalize the EG introduced above.
These mechanisms, which resemble a fixed path rule, are briefly introduced and dis-
18 See Young (1987) for a characterization of the symmetric parametric rules; see Moulin (2002) for a
more detailed description of the rules.
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Fig. 5 The asymmetric egalitarian mechanisms for two agents
cussed in section 1.8 of Moulin (2002). To illustrate the class of mechanisms, consider
a non-decreasing function fi : [0,Λ] → R+ such that fi (0) = 0 and fi (Λ) = ∞,
for every agent i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. Given the demands of the agents (y1, . . . , yk) and a
cost of the network c, the cost-share of agent i is given by
EG f1, f2,..., fki (c; y1, y2, . . . , yk) = min{ fi (λ∗), yi },
where λ∗ solves
∑k
i=1 min{ fi (λ∗), yi } = c.
Notice that the mechanism EG f1, f2,..., fki clearly meets IR since
EG f1, f2,..., fki (c; y1, y2, . . . , yk) ≤ yi .
The mechanism EG f1, f2,..., fki will be called an asymmetric egalitarian mechanism
(AEM).
Figure 5 illustrates the allocation of payments for EG f1, f2 at the problem (c; y1, y2).
The path used to compute the payments, {( f1(λ), f2(λ))|λ ≥ 0}, is generated by the
functions f1(λ) and f2(λ). In Fig. 5 left, the mechanism would allocate payments
equal to ( f1(λ∗), f2(λ∗)) because y1 ≥ f1(λ∗) and y2 ≥ f2(λ∗). On the other hand,
in Fig. 5 right, the mechanism would allocate payments equal to (y1, c − y1) because
y1 < f1(λ˜).
The EG is constructed by picking functions f1 = f2 = · · · = fk . The path
generated by these functions is the identity line
{(λ, λ, . . . , λ) ∈ Rk |λ ≥ 0}.
Alternatively, the weighted egalitarian mechanisms are constructed when fi (λ) =
wiλ for all i, for a given set of constants w1, . . . , wk . The path generated by such
functions is the ray {λ(w1, w2, . . . , wk)|λ ≥ 0}
Contrary to the traditional analysis of this problem, the games induced by the
AEMs are not potential games; see Sect. 9.2 for an example illustrating that. There-
fore, the previous potential techniques used in the analysis of this problem do not
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work anymore. In general, a mechanism induced by a rationing rule could not have a
pure strategy NE. Nevertheless, we show below that AEM and PRs always have pure
strategy Nash equilibria and provide algorithms to compute them.19
Lemma 2 The proportional and the asymmetric egalitarian mechanisms always have
a pure strategy NE.
Proof We prove the Lemma for an AEM. The proof for the PR is written in Sect. 6.
Consider the asymmetric EG ϕ generated by the functions f 1, . . . , f k .
Let si = minPi ∈Πi (N ) C(Pi ) be the stand-alone cost of agent i , and let
Si ∈ arg min
Pi ∈Πi (N )
C(Pi )
be his stand-alone path.
Let λi be the largest number such that f i (λi ) = si . Without loss of generality,
assume that λ1 ≤ λ2 ≤ · · · ≤ λk .
Consider a strategy profile T = (T 1, T 2, . . . , T k) and let t i = C(T i ) be the cost
of strategy T i . Let λ∗ be a solution to the system
∑
i min{t i , f i (λ∗)} = C(T ).
Given the strategy profile T , a br T¯ i of agent i is
T¯ i ∈ arg min
T˜ i ∈Πi (N )
ϕi (T˜ i , T −i ).
We say that the strategy profile T is Nash-convergent if for every agent i : (a)
ϕi (T ) = si , or (b) ϕi (T ) = f i (λ∗) and λ∗ ≤ λi .
Step 1. Consider a Nash-convergent profile T . Suppose that the br of agent j ,
with path Y j and cost C(Y j ) = y j , leads to a decrease in his cost-share, that is,
ϕ j (T ) > ϕ j (Y j , T − j ). Then, the profile (Y j , T − j ) is also a Nash-convergent profile
with smaller λ∗.
Let λ˜ be the smallest solution to min{y j , f j (λ˜)} + ∑i = j min{t i , f i (λ˜)} =
C(Y j , T − j ).
The relation λ˜ < λ∗ holds
Since T is Nash-convergent, then ϕ j (T ) = s j , or ϕ j (T ) = f j (λ∗) and λ∗ ≤ λi .
Case 1 ϕ j (T ) = s j .
Note that
min{t j , f j (λ∗)} = s j > min{y j , f j (λ˜)}.
Since s j is the stand-alone cost of agent j , then y j ≥ s j . Therefore,
min{y j , f j (λ˜)} = f j (λ˜). Thus,
min{t j , f j (λ∗)} > f j (λ˜).
19 Surprisingly, in both cases, the traditional br tatonnement, where at every step an agent picks the path
that minimizes his cost-share, starting from some profiles will converge to a NE.
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This implies, f j (λ∗) > f j (λ˜). By the monotonicity of f j , we have λ∗ > λ˜.
Case 2 ϕ j (T ) = f j (λ∗) and λ∗ ≤ λi .
Note that
min{t j , f j (λ∗)} = f j (λ∗) > min{y j , f j (λ˜)}. (1)
We show that y j ≥ f j (λ˜). Indeed, assume the contrary, that is f j (λ˜) > y j . Then,
min{y j , f j (λ˜)} = y j . Thus, from Eq. 1,
f j (λ∗) > y j ≥ s j . (2)
Since λ j ≥ λ∗, then s j = f j (λ j ) ≥ f j (λ∗). This contradicts equation 2. There-
fore, y j ≥ f j (λ˜).
Now, we show that λ∗ > λ˜. Since y j ≥ f j (λ˜), then from Eq. 1, f j (λ∗) > f j (λ˜).
Thus, λ∗ > λ˜ by the monotonicity of f j .
The profile (Y j , T − j ) is Nash-convergent
– First, we consider an agent i , where i = j , that satisfies case (a). That is, ϕi (T ) =
min{t i , f i (λ∗)} = si .
Since λ∗ > λ˜, then
si = min{t i , f i (λ∗)} ≥ min{t i , f i (λ˜)}. (3)
If ϕi (Y j , T − j ) = t i , then min{t i , f i (λ˜)} = t i . Therefore, by Eq. 3, si = t i .
Hence, ϕi (Y j , T − j ) = si .
On the other hand, if ϕi (Y j , T − j ) = f i (λ˜), then min{t i , f i (λ˜)} = f i (λ˜). There-
fore, by Eq. 3, si ≥ f i (λ˜). Since si = f i (λi ), then f i (λi ) ≥ f i (λ˜). Hence,
λi ≥ λ˜ by the monotonicity of f i and because λi is the maximal value that satis-
fies f i (λi ) = si .
– Second, we consider an agent i , where i = j , that satisfies case (b) ϕi (T ) = f i (λ∗)
and λ∗ ≤ λi .
Since ϕi (T ) = f i (λ∗), then min{t i , f i (λ∗)} = f i (λ∗). Thus, t i ≥ f i (λ∗).
Also, note that f i (λ∗) ≥ f i (λ˜) because λ∗ > λ˜. Hence, t i ≥ f i (λ˜). Thus,
ϕi (Y j , T − j ) = min{t i , f i (λ˜)} = f i (λ˜).
Since λ∗ ≤ λi and λ˜ ≤ λ∗, then λ˜ ≤ λi as desired.
– Third, we consider the agent j who changed his strategy. Since agent j is using
his br, then
ϕ j (Y j , T − j ) ≤ ϕ j (S j , T − j ) ≤ s j ,
where the last inequality comes from individual rationality.
If ϕ j (Y j , T − j ) = min{y j , f j (λ˜)} = y j , then y j ≤ s j . Since s j is the stand-alone
cost then s j ≤ y j . Therefore, y j = s j and case (a) is satisfied.
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On the other hand, if ϕ j (Y j , T − j ) = min{y j , f j (λ˜)} = f j (λ˜), then f j (λ˜) ≤
s j = f j (λ j ). Therefore λ˜ ≤ λ j by the monotonicity of f j and because λ j is the
maximal value that satisfies f j (λi ) = s j . Thus, case (b) is satisfied.
Step 2. The profile (S1, . . . , Sk) is a Nash-convergent profile.
Consider a solution λ∗∗ to the equation
∑
i
min{si , f i (λ∗∗)} = C(S1, . . . , Sk).
If ϕi (S1, . . . , Sk) = si , then case (a) holds.
If ϕi (S1, . . . , Sk) = f i (λ∗∗), then f i (λ∗∗) ≤ si holds by individual rationality.
Therefore, f i (λ∗∗) ≤ f i (λi ). Hence, λ∗∗ ≤ λi by the monotonicity of f i and because
λi is the maximal value that satisfies f i (λi ) = si . Thus, case (b) holds.
Step 3. Finally, we show the existence of equilibrium. The br tatonnement, where
at every step an agent picks a path that minimizes his cost-share, starting at profile
(S1, . . . , Sk), converges to a strategy profile in a finite number of iterations because
(S1, . . . , Sk) is Nash-convergent; then at every step, the value λ∗ decreases and there
are a finite number of strategies. The limit profile is a NE. unionsq
4.1 Weakly Pareto Nash implementation
Since the mechanisms characterized by Theorem 1 are demand independent, there are
no IR mechanisms that PNI the efficient graph. WPNI requires that the least inefficient
equilibrium Pareto dominate any other equilibrium. That is, WPNI might implement
several equilibria (and all of them might be inefficient), but the least inefficient equilib-
rium should be preferred by all agents to any other equilibrium. Clearly if a mechanism
satisfies PNI, then it satisfies WPNI.
Definition 10 A mechanisms ξ satisfies WPNI if
– for any problem N , the mechanism ξ has at least one NE,
– let P∗ be the equilibrium profile with the minimal cost; that is, C(P∗) ≤ C(P˜)
for any other equilibrium P˜. Then, ξ(P∗) ≤ ξ(P˜).
WPNI serves an equilibrium selection rule. If the NE is a good predictor of the
outcome implemented by the mechanism, then the least inefficient equilibrium stands
out as a selection since all agents prefer it.
Theorem 3 An asymmetric parametric mechanism meets WPNI if and only if it is an
asymmetric egalitarian mechanisms.
All the mechanisms discussed in this section are inefficient. The measure below
will serve as a selection criterion for different mechanisms.
Definition 11 The PoS of the mechanism ξ equals
max
N∈N ,P∗∈E f f (N )
{
minP∈N E(Γ ξ (N )) C(P)
C(P∗)
}
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The PoS, which computes the ratio between the cost of the best equilibrium and
the cost of the efficient graph, is a compelling measure of the inefficiency generated
by WPNI mechanisms since the agents’ incentives are aligned to pick the best NE.
Notice that PoS is always greater than or equal to 1. A mechanism is efficient if it
has a PoS equal to 1. The smaller the PoS, the more efficient the mechanism is.
Corollary 1 i. EG has the smallest PoS across all asymmetric parametric mecha-
nisms meeting WPNI. It has a PoS equal to H(k) = 1 + 12 + · · · + 1k .
ii. EG minimizes the PoS across all IR mechanisms.
iii. The PoS of P R is of order k.
Since the Sh has a PoS equal to H(k), EG is no more inefficient than the Sh. No
other IR mechanism can be more efficient than EG and Shapley. On the other hand,
the traditional PR is extremely inefficient; since its PoS is bounded by k, its maximal
loss approaches that in the limit.
The definition of WPNI does not rule out the existence of another mechanism
whose equilibria (possibly not Pareto ranked) are less inefficient than the equilibria of
a WPNI mechanism. However, from part i i , we can see that EG is not more inefficient
than any other mechanism that satisfies individual rationality. Therefore, EG stands
out as a more efficient selection even among mechanisms that do not Pareto rank the
equilibria.
4.2 Strong Nash implementation of the minimal cost
Definition 12 A mechanism ξ strongly Nash implements the equilibrium with the
minimal cost (SNIMC) if
– for any problem N , the mechanism ξ has at least one NE, and
– let P∗ be the equilibrium profile with the minimal cost; that is, C(P∗) ≤ C(P˜) for
any other equilibrium P˜ . Then, P∗ is a strong NE, that is, if ξi (PS, P∗N\S) > ξi (P∗)
for some demands PS of the agents in S and i ∈ S, then ξ j (PS, P∗N\S) < ξ j (P∗)
for some agent j ∈ S.
If a mechanism SNI the efficient graph (SNI), then it SNIMC. The converse is not
true, since the equilibrium with the minimal cost might not be efficient. The AEMs
are such examples.
Proposition 2 The asymmetric egalitarian mechanisms SNIMC.
Notice that together with the WPNI property of AEM, this proposition implies that
there is one and only one strong NE under AEM. This comes from the fact that the
Nash equilibria are Pareto ranked, and thus, under any NE other than the cheapest, the
grand coalition has a profitable deviation. This means that the strong price of anarchy
(SPoA) of the EG equals the strong PoS of EG, and they equal H(k). This earmarks
another advantage of EG over Sh, since we know that Sh does not always admit strong
NE Anshelevich et al. (2004), Chen et al. (2008), and therefore, SPoA does not exist
for Sh.
We conjecture that the only mechanisms that SNIMC are the AEMs.
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5 Proof of Theorems 1 and 2
5.1 Preliminary Lemmas
Definition 13 The mechanism ξ that uses minimal information is monotonic in cost
if for all feasible problems (c; y), (c′; y) ∈ N K such that c < c′: ξ(c; y) ≤ ξ(c′; y).
Lemma 3 If the mechanism ξ that uses minimal information is efficient then, it is
monotonic in total cost.
Proof Consider two feasible problems (c; y) and (c′; y), where c′ > c and (c′ −
c) < mini∈K {yi }. Suppose that there exists an agent i and an efficient ξ such that
ξi (c
′; y) < ξi (c; y).
We construct a network that has two potential profiles (c; y) and (c′; y).
Indeed, consider a network where agents j = i have just one strategy each, Pj ,
which costs y j . Agent i has two strategies, Pi and P ′i , both of which cost yi , but Pi
makes the total cost of the network c, and P ′i makes the total cost go up to c′.
Case 1: c ≤ ∑ j =i y j .
In this case, we can have a configuration as shown in Fig. 6. Here, the demands
of agents in K\{i} are contained in the interval a → b, which costs c. This is
possible since when c = ∑ j =i y j , we can have a → b as the concatenation of
the demand links of the agents j = i . When c < ∑ j =i y j , we can have the
demand links overlapping, for example, when max j =i {y j } = c, then a → b is
the demand link of the biggest demander and all other demands overlap with his.
Pi = si → v1 → v2 → v3 → ti and P ′i = si → v2 → v3 → ti . All the costly
links of Pi are contained in {⋃ j =i Pj }, whereas there are links of cost c′ − c that
are not contained in {⋃ j =i Pj } under P ′i . Again, this is possible since c′ and c are
close enough to guarantee that for all i we can have such paths.
Case 2:
∑
j∈K y j > c >
∑
j =i y j .
In this case, we can have a configuration as shown in Fig. 7. Here, the interval
a → b is the concatenation of the demand links of agents in K\{i} . Thus, |a → b| =∑
j =i y j , |si → a| = c −
∑
j =i y j , |a → d| = c′ − c. |si → a → d| = |si → a′ →
Fig. 6 EFF implies cost monotonicity (case 1)
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Fig. 7 EFF implies cost monotonicity (case 2)
Fig. 8 EFF implies separability
d| = c′ − ∑ j =i y j . Pi = si → a → d → ti and P ′i = si → a′ → d → ti . Notice
that it may be the case that ti = b.
Now clearly in both cases, i will have a profitable deviation from the efficient graph
of cost c, thus contradicting the efficiency of ξ . Thus, we have shown that efficient ξ
must be monotonic in total cost in some open neighborhood of c, for all c. Therefore,
we can extend the argument to conclude that ξ must be monotonic in total cost in
general. unionsq
Lemma 4 (Separability Lemma) If the mechanism ξ that uses minimal information is
efficient then ξ(C; y) = (ξ1(C; y−1), ξ2(C; y−2), . . . , ξk(C; y−k)). That is, any effi-
cient mechanism is separable and assigns the costs-shares to the agents independently
of their demand.
Proof If we prove that for any feasible problems (c; y) and (c; y˜i , y−i ), any continuous
and efficient ξ must have ξi (c; y) = ξi (c; y˜i , y−i ), then we are done. Consider a
feasible problem (c; y). Consider a graph as shown in Fig. 8, which generates this
problem. The sources and sinks of agents j = i lie on the ray a → b according to the
demand profile, that is, the agent with the highest demand covers most of the span on
a → b, and so on. Thus, an agent j = i has one strategy that generates the demand
y j . Agent i has two strategies -connect si − ti either through v1 or through v2. The
demands of agent i when connecting through v1 and v2 are y˜i and yi , respectively.
Now, the total costs when i uses v1 and v2 are, respectively, c + 	 and c. Notice that
by moving the position of v2 and arranging the demand links of the agents j = i , we
can generate all the feasible problems (c; yi , y−i ). Also, by moving the position of v1
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and arranging the demand links of the agents j = i , we can generate all the feasible
problems (c + 	; yi , y−i ). Consider an efficient ξ that is continuous. The efficiency of
ξ requires the following inequality
ξi (c; yi , y−i ) ≤ ξi (c + 	; y˜i , y−i ) (4)
Using continuity, we get
ξi (c; yi , y−i ) ≤ ξi (c; y˜i , y−i ) (5)
Similarly, switching the position of v1 and v2 and using continuity again we get
ξi (c; yi , y−i ) ≥ ξi (c; y˜i , y−i ) (6)
Thus, we conclude that ξi (c; yi , y−i ) = ξi (c; y˜i , y−i ) for all feasible problems
(c; yi , y−i ) and (c; y˜i , y−i ). unionsq
5.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof Consider a problem (c; y1, y2) ∈ S2.
By Separability Lemma ξ1(c; y1, y2) = ξ1(c; c, y2).
By budget balance ξ2(c; y1, y2) = ξ2(c; c, y2). Thus, ξ(c; y1, y2) = ξ(c; c, y2).
By Separability Lemma ξ2(c; c, y2) = ξ2(c; c, c).
By budget balance ξ1(c; c, y2) = ξ1(c; c, c). Thus, ξ(c; c, y2) = ξ(c; c, c).
Therefore, ξ(c; y1, y2) = ξ(c; c, c).
Let f (c) = ξ(c; c, c). Since the mechanism is monotonic in the total cost (Lemma
3), f (c) is monotonic in the total cost.
unionsq
5.3 Proof of Theorem 1
5.3.1 1. ⇒ 4.
Consider a continuous ξ that is efficient and strongly monotonic. Consider two arbi-
trary feasible problems (c; y) and (c; y˜). We will prove that ξ(c; y) = ξ(c; y˜) = f (c).
The monotonicity of f comes from Lemma 3. Let a = 1k
∑
i∈K yi and a˜ = 1k
∑
i∈K y˜i .
Assume without loss of generality that y1 ≤ y2 ≤ y3 ≤ · · · ≤ yk and y˜1 ≤ y˜2 ≤ y˜3 ≤
· · · ≤ y˜k .
Step 1: ξ(c; y) = ξ(c; a, a, . . . , a) and ξ(c; y˜) = ξ(c; a˜, a˜, . . . , a˜)
Proof Consider the following problems:
P0 = (c; y), P1 = (c; a, y2, y3, . . . , yk),
P2 = (c; a, a, y3, y4, . . . , yk), . . . , Pk = (c; a, a, . . . , a).
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First, notice that the feasibility of P0 implies the feasibility of
P1, P2, . . . , Pk .
This is true because all individual demands are bounded above by yk , and the aggregate
demand at any problem is at least k(a) = ∑i∈K yi ≥ c by the feasibility of P0.
Similarly, we define the counterpart problems P˜0, P˜1, P˜2, . . . , P˜k where
P˜i = (c; a˜, a˜, . . . , a˜, y˜i+1, y˜i+2, . . . , y˜k−1, y˜k).
By the above argument these problems are also feasible.
Now, due to the Separability Lemma, we must have ξ1(P0) = ξ1(P1). By strong
monotonicity and budget balance ξ−1(P0) = ξ−1(P1). Thus, we have ξ(P0) = ξ(P1).
Using the same argument, we have ξ(Pi ) = ξ(Pi+1) and ξ(P˜i ) = ξ(P˜i+1) for all
0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1. Thus, we have ξ(P0) = ξ(Pk) and ξ(P˜0) = ξ(P˜k) as desired. unionsq
Step 2: ξ(c; a, a, . . . , a) = ξ(c; a˜, a˜, . . . , a˜)
Proof First, notice that the feasibility of (c; a, a, . . . , a) and ξ(c; a˜, a˜, . . . , a˜) implies
that any problem (c; aˆ) where some of the aˆi = a and other aˆi = a˜ is also feasible.
Now, the Separability Lemma implies ξ1(c; a, a˜, . . . , a˜) = ξ1(c; a˜, a˜, . . . , a˜). Now,
there can be three cases: (1) a < a˜ (2) a > a˜ or (3) a = a˜. In the first two cases, strong
monotonicity and budget balance imply ξ−1(c; a, a˜, . . . , a˜) = ξ−1(c; a˜, a˜, . . . , a˜) and
we get ξ(c; a, a˜, . . . , a˜) = ξ(c; a˜, a˜, . . . , a˜). The third case trivially implies
ξ(c; a, a˜, . . . , a˜) = ξ(c; a˜, a˜, . . . , a˜).
Similarly, we get
ξ(c; a˜, a˜, . . . , a˜)=ξ(c; a, a˜, . . . , a˜) = ξ(c; a, a, a˜, . . . , a˜)=· · ·=ξ(c; a, a, . . . , a).
unionsq
5.3.2 2. ⇒ 1.
Proof We know that ξ PNI efficient graph implies that ξ is efficient. We will prove
that if ξ PNI the efficient graph, then ξ is strongly monotonic. Consider a ξ that PNI
the efficient graph and a feasible problem (c; y) and assume without loss of generality
that y1 < y2 < · · · < yk .20 Now, consider a graph as shown in Fig. 9 below.
Here every agent has two strategies -either use the path in the solid graph or use
that in the dotted graph. We call the solid graph ** and the dotted graph *. Let *
be a small perturbation of ** as follows. The cost of the path of an agent j = i in
both graphs is y j . The cost of the paths of agent i in ** and * are yi and y˜i where
y˜i is in a neighborhood of yi and y˜i > yi and |y˜i − yi | < min j,k∈K |y j − yk |. This
20 The case of weak inequality follows by continuity of the mechanism.
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Fig. 9 PNI implies SM
restriction guarantees that the ranking will be preserved in the perturbed problem. Let
the total cost of ** and * be c − 	 and c, respectively. First, we will show that this
graph generates all feasible problems (c; y). This happens if and only if the following
system has a solution
x1 + a1 = y1
x2 + a2 + a1 = y2
x3 + a3 + a2 + a1 = y3
:
:
xk + ak + ak−1 + · · · + a1 = yk
k∑
i=1
xi +
k∑
i=1
ai = c
∀i ∈ K xi , ai ≥ 0
We use Farka’s Lemma to prove that this system indeed has a solution.
From Farka’s Lemma, we know that Ax = b and x ≥ 0 has a solution if and only
if ATz ≥ 0 and bTz < 0 does not have a solution.
Here, the (k + 1) × (2k) matrix A, vector x , and vector b are defined as follows
A =
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎣
1 0 0 . . . 1 0 0 . . .
0 1 0 . . . 1 1 0 . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1 1 1 . . . 1 1 1 . . .
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎦
x = [ x1 x2 . . . xk a1 a2 . . . ak
]T
b = [ y1 y2 . . . yk c
]T
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ATz ≥ 0 and bTz < 0 gives the following (2k + 1) inequalities:
z1 + z2 + · · · + zk+1 ≥ 0 (1)
z2 + z3 + · · · + zk+1 ≥ 0 (2)
: (:)
zk + zk+1 ≥ 0 (k)
z1 + zk+1 ≥ 0 (k + 1)
z2 + zk+1 ≥ 0 (k + 2)
: (:)
zk + zk+1 ≥ 0 (2k)
y1z1 + y2z2 + · · · + yk zk + czk+1 < 0 (2k + 1)
Now, we do the following operation on the first k inequalities:
y1 × (1) + (y2 − y1) × (2) + · · · + (yk − yk−1) × (k),
and the result is
y1z1 + y2z2 + · · · + yk zk + yk zk+1 ≥ 0. (2k + 2)
Now, for the inequalities (2k +1) and (2k +2) to be compatible, it must be the case
that zk+1 < 0. Let this be the case and let (2k + 2) and (2k + 1) hold. Then, (2k + 1)
implies
y1z1 + y2z2 + · · · + yk zk +
(
∑
i∈K
yi
)
zk+1 < 0 (2k + 3)
This is true because feasibility requires
∑
i∈K yi ≥ c. Now, if we do the following
operation on inequalities (k+1) through (2k): y1×(k+1)+y2×(k+2)+· · ·+yn×(2k),
then we get
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y1z1 + y2z2 + · · · + yk zk +
(
∑
i∈K
yi
)
zk+1 ≥ 0 (2k + 4)
which contradicts (2k + 3), to give us the desired result.
We now prove the strong monotonicity of ξ . Clearly, the efficiency of ξ implies
that ** is a NE. Since * is a perturbation of **, then we will have * also as a NE for a
perturbation small enough. Since ξ PNI the efficient graph implies that
ξ(c − 	; yi , y−i ) ≤ ξ(c; y˜i , y−i )
Using continuity, we get
ξ(c; yi , y−i ) ≤ ξ(c; y˜i , y−i )
Now consider a perturbation where everything is exactly the same except ** costs
c + 	. Using the same argument of Pareto Nash implementability and continuity we
get
ξ(c; yi , y−i ) ≥ ξ(c; y˜i , y−i )
Thus, ξ(c; yi , y−i ) = ξ(c; y˜i , y−i ) for y˜i in an open neighborhood of yi .
By repeatedly using the open neighborhood argument, we get
ξ(c; yi , y−i ) = ξ(c; y˜i , y−i )
for any arbitrary yi and y˜i as long as (c; yi , y−i ) and (c; y˜i , y−i ) are both feasible
problems. unionsq
5.3.3 3. ⇒ 4.
Consider a continuous ξ that implements the efficient graph in strong NE. Consider
two feasible problems (c; y) and (c; y˜). We will prove that ξ(c; y) = ξ(c; y˜) = f (c).
The monotonicity of f comes from Lemma 3. Let a = 1k
∑
i∈K yi and a˜ = 1k
∑
i∈K y˜i .
Assume without loss of generality that y1 ≤ y2 ≤ y3 ≤ · · · ≤ yk and y˜1 ≤ y˜2 ≤ y˜3 ≤
· · · ≤ y˜k .
Step 1: ξ(c; y) = ξ(c; a, a, . . . , a) and ξ(c; y˜) = ξ(c; a˜, a˜, . . . , a˜)
Proof Consider the following problems:
P0 = (c; y), P1 = (c; a, y2, y3, . . . , yk), P2 = (c; a, a, y3, y4, . . . , yk), . . .
. . . , Pk = (c; a, a, . . . , a).
First, notice that the feasibility of P0 implies the feasibility of
P1, P2, . . . , Pk .
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This is true because all individual demands are bounded above by yk , and the aggregate
demand at any problem is at least k(a) = ∑i∈K yi ≥ c by the feasibility of P0.
Similarly, we define the counterpart problems P˜0, P˜1, P˜2, . . . , P˜k where
P˜i = (c; a˜, a˜, . . . , a˜, y˜i+1, y˜i+2, . . . , y˜k−1, y˜k).
By the above argument these problems are also feasible.
Now, due to the Separability Lemma, we must have ξ1(P0) = ξ1(P1). Also, strong
Nash implementability implies that ξ−1(P0) = ξ−1(P1). To see this, suppose that it is
not the case and for some agent j = 1, we have ξ j (P0) = ξ j (P1). Assume without
loss of generality that ξ j (P0) < ξ j (P1). This means that there exists j` ∈ K\{1, j}
such that ξ j` (P0) > ξ j` (P1) (by budget balance). Consider a network where all the
agents 2, 3, . . . , k have just one strategy, which costs y2, y3, . . . , yk and agent 1 has
two strategies, where one of them costs y1 and the other costs a. In both cases, the total
cost of the network is c. Thus, one of the configurations generates the problem P0 and
the other P1. Now both the configurations of the network are efficient, and therefore,
at least one of them must be a strong NE under ξ . But, clearly none of them is a strong
NE. From P1, the group {1, j} has a profitable deviation and from P0 the group {1, j`}.
Thus, we have ξ(P0) = ξ(P1). Using the same argument, we have ξ(Pi ) = ξ(Pi+1)
and ξ(P˜i ) = ξ(P˜i+1) for all 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1. Thus, we have ξ(P0) = ξ(Pk) and
ξ(P˜0) = ξ(P˜k), as desired. unionsq
Step 2: ξ(c; a, a, . . . , a) = ξ(c; a˜, a˜, . . . , a˜)
Proof First, notice that the feasibility of problems
(c; a, a, . . . , a) and ξ(c; a˜, a˜, . . . , a˜)
implies that any problem (c; aˆ) where aˆi = a or aˆi = a˜ for all i is also a feasible prob-
lem. Now, the Separability Lemma implies ξ1(c; a, a˜, . . . , a˜) = ξ1(c; a˜, a˜, . . . , a˜).
Again, the strong Nash implementability implies
ξ−1(c; a, a˜, . . . , a˜) = ξ−1(c; a˜, a˜, . . . , a˜).
The proof of this statement is analogous to the one in step 1. Thus, we have
ξ(c; a, a˜, . . . , a˜) = ξ(c; a˜, a˜, . . . , a˜). Similarly, we get
ξ(c; a˜, a˜, . . . , a˜) = ξ(c; a, a˜, . . . , a˜)=ξ(c; a, a, a˜, . . . , a˜)= . . .=ξ(c; a, a, . . . , a).
unionsq
The results “4. ⇒ 1.,” “4. ⇒ 2,” and “4. ⇒ 3” are straightforward and
their proofs are omitted.
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5.4 Proof of Theorem 2
Proof The “if” part is clear. For “only if,” consider a feasible problem (c; y). Assume
without loss of generality that y1 ≥ y2 ≥ y3 ≥ · · · ≥ yk . Let a = 1k
∑k
i=1 yi . Consider
a problem (c; a, a, . . . , a) and suppose that ξ is continuous, efficient and satisfies ETE.
Notice that the feasibility of (c; y) implies the feasibility of (c; a, a, . . . , a) and any
other problem (c; yˆ) where yˆi = yi for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , l} and yˆi = a for all
i ∈ {l, l + 1, . . . , k − 1, k}. Now, the ETE property of ξ implies
ξ(c; a, a, . . . , a) = (c/k, c/k, . . . , c/k). (7)
Using the Separability Lemma and applying ETE again, we get
ξ(c; y1, a, . . . , a) = (c/k, c/k, . . . , c/k). (8)
Now again applying the Separability Lemma and ETE, we have
ξ(c; y1, y2, a, a, . . . , a) = (x1, c/k, x, x, . . . , x). (9)
But if we change the ordering of 1 and 2 while arriving at the above profile, then
we have
ξ(c; y1, y2, a, a, . . . , a) = (c/k, x2, x, x, . . . , x). (10)
But since the ordering is immaterial, we must have x1, x2, x = c/k. And thus we
have
ξ(c; y1, y2, a, a, . . . , a) = (c/k, c/k, . . . , c/k). (11)
Repeating the same argument, we conclude that
ξ(c; y) = (c/k, c/k, . . . , c/k).
unionsq
6 Proof of Lemma 2
We show the existence of equilibrium for PR.
Proof We prove a stronger property, which is that the br dynamics (one agent at a time)
of any arbitrarily fixed ordering of agents converges to a NE, no matter where we start
the br dynamics from. Suppose, on the contrary, that for some fixed ordering of the
agents the br dynamics from some strategy profile s does not converge. This means
that there is a cycle of a finite length l : s(1) → s(2) → s(3) → · · · → s(l) → s(1).
Say, without loss of generality, that this cycle includes deviations by the set of agents
M = {1, 2, . . . , m} ⊆ K . The strategy of agents in K \ M is fixed at s−M . Notice that
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l is at least as big as 2m. This is so because after the l brs, we arrive at the original
strategy profile s(1). Every agent in M is a part of the cycle, which in turn means
that they change their strategy at least once. Therefore, it must be the case that every
agent in M takes its turn at least twice so that they reach the original profile s(1). We
assume that agent i ∈ M takes its turn in the br dynamics ni number of times, where
ni > 1, so that
∑
i∈M ni = l. Let the strategies played by agent i in the cycle be
si;1, si;2, . . . , si;ni , si;1, and so on. We call the agent who takes his turn of br in the
movement from st to st+1 agent at . Therefore, s(1) = (s1;1, s2;1, . . . , sm;1, s−M ) ,
s(2) = (sa1;2, s−a1(1)), s(3) = (sa2;2, s−a2(2)),…,s(l − 1) = (sal−1;nal−1 , s−al−1(l −
2)), s(l) = (sal ;nal , s−al (l − 1)). Here, we use the standard notation where s−i (t)
represents the strategy profile of K\{i} fixed at that in s(t). We abuse the notation
and say that the cost of s p;i is equal to s p;i . Here the cost of the network formed by
the strategy profile s(i) = C(Gs(i)). Now, P R(C(Gs(i)); s(i)) = s j;p Ai where Ai is
fixed for any particular s(i) and s j;p represents the strategy of agent j in s(i). The
fixed Ai for any s(i) is the ratio of C(Gs(i)) to the sum of the costs of individual paths
in s(i).
Now every step of the cycle corresponds to an inequality, which we will present as
follows:
Step 1: s(1) → s(2) ⇒
sa1;2 × A2 < sa1;1 × A1 (1)
Step 2: s(2) → s(3) ⇒
sa2;2 × A3 < sa2;1 × A2 (2)
Step 3: s(3) → s(4) ⇒
sa3;t × A4 < sa3;t−1 × A3 where t =
{
3 if a3 = a1
2 otherwise
}
(3)
Step p: s(p) → s(p + 1) ⇒
sap;t × Ap+1 < sap;t−1 × Ap where t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , nap } (p)
Step l: sl → s1 ⇒
sal ;nal × A1 < sal ;nal −1 × Al (l)
If we multiply the systems (2), (3), . . . , (l) together,21 then everything else cancels
out and we are left with sa1;2 × A2 > sa1;1 × A1, which contradicts the inequality
(1). Therefore, we conclude that there cannot be any cycle regardless of the ordering
of agents and regardless of at which initial point we follow the br dynamics.
unionsq
21 Notice that we can do that since all expressions are positive.
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7 Proof of Theorem 3
7.1 Any AEM meets WPNI
We start from an AEM ϕ determined by the functions f 1, . . . , f k .
Let si be the stand-alone cost of agent i and let Si be a stand-alone path of agent i .
That is, Si is a demand path of agent i with cost si .
Let λi be the largest number such that f i (λi ) = si . Without loss of generality,
assume that λ1 ≤ λ2 ≤ · · · ≤ λk .
Let λ∗ be such that
∑
i
min{C(Xi ), f i (λ∗)} = C(X1, . . . , Xk).
Step 1. For any NE X = (X1, . . . , Xk), there is an index m such that:
i. ϕi (X) = si for i = 1, . . . , m,
ii. ϕh(X) = f h(λ∗) for h > m, and
iii. λm < λ∗ ≤ λm+1.
Proof When there is no confusion, we denote ϕ j (X) simply as ϕ j for any agent j.
Consider the set M = {i ∈ K¯ |ϕi < f i (λ∗)}.
First, note that if j ∈ M , then ϕ j = s j and C(X j ) = s j . Since
ϕ j = min{C(X j ), f j (λ∗)} < f j (λ∗),
then ϕ j = C(X j ). Note that C(X j ) ≥ s j because s j is the stand-alone cost of agent
j . If C(X j ) > s j then
ϕ j (X) = C(X j ) > s j ≥ ϕ j (S j , X− j ),
where the last inequality follows by individual rationality. Therefore, agent j can
deviate to his stand-alone path S j , which contradicts the fact that X is a NE. Thus,
C(X j ) = s j and ϕ j (X) = C(X j ) = s j .
Notice that M is a set of consecutive agents. We will show that if j ∈ M , where
j > 1, then j −1 ∈ M . Indeed, if j ∈ M, then s j < f j (λ∗). Thus, f j (λ j ) < f j (λ∗).
Therefore, λ j < λ∗ by the monotonicity of f j . Since λ j−1 ≤ λ j , then λ j−1 < λ∗.
Therefore, s j−1 = f j−1(λ j−1) < f j−1(λ∗) by the monotonicity of f j−1 and the
choice of λ j−1.
Now, we see that ϕ j−1 < f j−1(λ∗). To get a contradiction, assume that ϕ j−1 =
f j−1(λ∗). Then, ϕ j−1 > s j−1. Since s j−1 ≥ ϕ j−1(S j−1, X j−1), then ϕ j−1(X) >
ϕ j−1(S j , X j−1). This contradicts the fact that X is a NE. Hence, ϕ j−1 < f j−1(λ∗),
thus j − 1 ∈ M.
Denote M = {1, . . . , m}. For this set, conditions i and ii are satisfied. Now, we see
that iii also holds.
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Assume that λ∗ > λm+1 then f m+1(λ∗) > f m+1(λm+1) = sm+1 by the
monotonicity of f m+1 and because λm+1 is the maximal value that satisfies
f m+1(λm+1) = sm+1. Thus, ϕm+1 > sm+1. Since ϕm+1(Sm+1, X−(m+1)) ≤ sm+1 by
individual rationality, then ϕm+1 > ϕm+1(Sm+1, X−(m+1)). Therefore, agent m + 1
can decrease his cost-share at profile X by deviating to Sm+1. This contradicts X to
be a NE. Hence, λ∗ ≤ λm+1.
Finally, since C(Xi ) = si for i = 1, . . . , m, and ϕi = si , then f i (λi ) = si <
f i (λ∗). Thus, by the monotonicity of f i , we have that λi < λ∗. unionsq
Step 2. ϕ Pareto ranks the equilibria.
Proof Consider any two equilibria X = (X1, . . . , Xk) and X˜ = (X˜1, . . . , X˜ k). Let
(m, λ) and (m˜, λ˜) be the values given by step 1 for equilibrium X and X˜ , respectively.
If m < m˜, then λ < λ˜. Indeed, by step 1 (part iii), λ ≤ λm+1 ≤ λm˜ < λ˜. Therefore,
by step 1 (parts i and ii), agents {1, . . . , m} are indifferent between both equilibria and
agents {m + 1, . . . , k} strictly prefer equilibrium X to X˜ .
On the other hand, if m = m˜, then agents {1, . . . , m} are indifferent between both
equilibria, and agents {m+1, . . . , k} rank the equilibrium depending on whether λ < λ˜
or vice versa. unionsq
7.2 WPNI implies AEM
We start the proof for two agents.
7.2.1 Proof for two agents
Step 1. The mechanisms satisfy truncation, that is, ϕ[c; y1, y2] = ϕ[c; y˜1, y˜2] for any
(y˜1, y˜2) ≥ ϕ[c; y1, y2].
Proof Consider a feasible profile (c; y1, y2) such that y1 + y2 > c. Let (p1, p2) be
such that ϕ(c; y1, y2) = (p1, p2) and assume without loss of generality that p1 < y1.
Consider y˜1 such that p1 < y˜1 < y1.
Construct the network depicted in Fig. 10 such that agent 1 has two strategies with
costs y1 and y˜1, agent 2 also has two strategies with the same cost y2, and the costs of
the top and bottom problems are (c + 	; y1, y2) and (c; y˜1, y2), respectively.
Clearly, the graphs that generate (c+	; y1, y2) and (c; y˜1, y2) are a NE for small 	.
By WPNI, ϕ(c + 	; y1, y2) ≥ (c; y˜1, y2).
As 	 tends to zero, and using continuity
ϕ(c; y1, y2) ≥ ϕ(c; y˜1, y2). (12)
Similarly, consider the network in Fig. 11 such that agent 1 has two strategies with
costs y1 and y˜1, agent 2 also has two strategies with the same cost y2, and the costs of
the top and bottom problems are (c; y1, y2) and (c + 	; y˜1, y2), respectively.
Clearly, those two problems are Nash equilibria for small 	.
By WPNI ϕ(c + 	; y˜1, y2) ≥ ϕ(c; y1, y2).
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Fig. 10 WPNI implies AEM
(part 1)
Fig. 11 WPNI implies AEM
(part 2)
As 	 tends to zero, and using continuity
ϕ(c; y˜1, y2) ≥ ϕ(c; y1, y2). (13)
by Eqs. 12 and 13
ϕ(c; y˜1, y2) = ϕ(c; y1, y2).
unionsq
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Fig. 12 Monotonicity at
truncation point
For any c > 0, let g(c) = ϕ[c; c, c].
Step 2. ϕ[c; y1, y2] = g(c) if (y1, y2) ≥ g(c); = (y1, c − y1) if y1 < g1(c); =
(c − y2, y2) if y2 < g2(c).
Proof By step 1 and continuity, ϕ[c; y1, y2] = g(c) if (y1, y2) ≥ g(c).
Consider y = (y1, c) such that y1 < g1(c); and let (p1, p2) = ϕ[c; y1, c]. Assume
that p1 < y1.
By continuity, ϕ1(y1 + 	, c) → p1 as 	 tends to zero. Let 	˜ by such that p˜1 =
ϕ1(y1 + 	˜, c) < y1.
Consider the demand ( p˜1+y12 , c), by truncation ϕ(c; p˜1+y12 , y˜2) = ( p˜1, c− p˜1), for
any y2 > c − p1.
Similarly, ϕ(c; p˜1+y12 , y˜2) = (p1, c − p1), which is a contradiction.
By truncation, ϕ1(y1 + 	˜, c) < y1. unionsq
Step 3. The mechanism is weakly monotonic at the truncation point. That is, g(c) <
g(c˜) for c < c˜.
Proof Suppose that the mechanism is not weakly monotonic at the truncation point.
Then, for any small 	, we can find c and c + 	 such that g2(c) > g2(c + 	) and
g1(c) > g1(c + 	) (or vice versa).
Pick small 	 and b  max{g(c), g(c + 	)} and c > b1 + b2.
Consider the network depicted in Fig. 12 such that every agent has two strategies
of equal cost b1 and b2 and generates problems (c; b1, b2) and (c+	; b1, b2). Clearly,
there are only two equilibria with costs c and c + 	, but they are not Pareto ranked
since ϕ(c; b1, b2) = g(c) and ϕ(c + 	; b1, b2) = g(c + 	). unionsq
Step 4. The mechanism can be represented by the above functions.
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Proof Consider the AEM represented by the functions gi (c) as above. It is easy to
show that this mechanism generates the mechanism as above.
Indeed, consider (c; y) feasible. Then, if (y1, y2) ≥ g(c), then ϕ(c; y) = g(c).
If y1 < g1(c), then by truncation ϕ1(c; y) = g1(c) and ϕ2(c; y) = c − g1(c).
If y2 < g2(c), then by truncation ϕ2(c; y) = g2(c) and ϕ1(c; y) = c − g2(c).
unionsq
7.2.2 Extension to more than two agents
Proof Consider any parametric solution with k agents, k > 2. We can replicate the
above arguments for a network of any two agents {i, j} by setting yl = 0 for l =
i, j (demanding independent demands with cost zero). Thus, by the previous case,
Fi (λ, yi ) = min{yi , gi (λ)} for some non-decreasing function gi (λ). unionsq
8 Proof of Corollary 4
8.1 P O S(EG) = H(k)
Consider the efficient profile P = (P1, . . . , Pk) with cost c∗. Assume without loss
of generality that C(P1) ≥ C(P2) ≥ · · · ≥ C(Pk). Let Si be a stand-alone path
of agent i with cost si . Let p = EG(c∗; C(P1), C(P2), . . . , C(Pk)). Clearly p1 ≥
p2 ≥ · · · ≥ pk, and pi ≤ c∗i for i = 1, . . . , k. Let λ∗ and m be such that pk ≤ pk−1 ≤
· · · ≤ pm+1 < λ∗ = pm = · · · = p1. Let K˜ = {i |si < λ∗}. That is, K˜ is the set of
agents with a stand-alone cost less than λ∗. Consider the profile Q = (P
(K˜ )c , SK˜ );
that is, the strategy from each agent in K˜ is replaced by his stand-alone path.
Clearly, if i > m then i ∈ K˜ , since si ≤ pi < λ∗. Therefore, Q contains at least
all agents who are paying their demand at P , but might include others.
Let k˜ = |K˜ | be the cardinality of K˜ . First, notice that
C(SK˜ ) ≤ (k˜ − m)λ∗ + sm+1 + · · · + sk ≤ (k˜ − m)
c∗
m
+ c
∗
m + 1 + · · · +
c∗
k
.
Therefore C(S
(K˜ )) ≤ c
∗
k−k˜+1 + · · · +
c∗
k .
Hence, C(Q) ≤ c∗ + C(S
(K˜ )) ≤ c∗ + c
∗
k−k˜+1 + · · · +
c∗
k .
We repeat the above algorithm consecutively to the profile Q. That is, we find λ and
move all agents with stand-alone cost less than λ to their stand-alone path. Since there
is at most k agents, this algorithm finishes in at most k steps. Let R be the final profile
of this algorithm. From the above arguments, C(R) ≤ H(k)c∗. Let λ˜ be the solution to
the problem EG(C(R); C(R1), . . . , C(Rk)). If EGi (C(R); C(R1), . . . , C(Rk)) = λ˜
then si ≥ λ˜. On the other hand, if EGi (C(R); C(R1), . . . , C(Rk)) < λ˜ then Ri = Si .
Similar to the existence of equilibrium for AEM, the br tatonnement would converge
to an equilibrium starting from profile R, since λ and the cost would decrease at every
step.
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Indeed, if an agent is paying his stand-alone cost, the only way to decrease his
payment is by increasing his demand, and thus decreasing his cost. Therefore, λ˜
should decrease. At his br, his stand-alone cost should be larger than the new λ.
On the contrary, if an agent is paying λ˜, then his br should decrease λ˜ because his
stand-alone cost is larger than λ˜.
8.2 For any AEM ξ such that ξ = EG we have PoS(ξ) > H(k)
Proof Consider the AEM ξ generated by the functions f 1, . . . , f k . Since ξ = EG,
then there is i, j such that f i = f j .
Let λ∗ be such that f i (λ∗) = f j (λ∗), and c∗ such that c∗ = f 1(λ∗)+· · ·+ f k(λ∗).
There is an agent l such that f l(λ∗) > c∗k ,without loss of generality, assume that this
agent is agent k. That is, f k(λ∗) > c∗k . Let ϕ∗k = ϕk[c∗; c∗, . . . , c∗] = f k(λ∗) > c
∗
k .
Consider the problem [c∗ + f k(λ∗); c∗, c∗, . . . , f k(λ∗)]. Since
ϕk[c∗ + f k(λ∗); c∗, c∗, . . . , f k(λ∗)] ≤ f k(λ∗),
then there is an agent l, where l = k, such that
ϕl [c∗ + f k(λ∗); c∗, c∗, . . . , f k(λ∗)] ≥ c
∗
k − 1 .
Without loss of generality, assume that this agent is agent k − 1. Let
ϕ∗k−1 = ϕk−1[c∗ + f k(λ∗); c∗, c∗, . . . , f k(λ∗)],
thus ϕ∗k−1 ≥ c
∗
k−1 .
Consider the problem
[c∗ + ϕ∗k−1 + f k(λ∗); c∗, c∗, . . . , c∗, ϕ∗k−1, f k(λ∗)].
Since
ϕk[c∗ + ϕ∗k−1 + f k(λ∗); c∗, c∗, . . . , c∗, ϕ∗k−1, f k(λ∗)] ≤ f k(λ∗)
and
ϕk−1[c∗ + ϕ∗k−1 + f k(λ∗); c∗, c∗, . . . , c∗, ϕ∗k−1, f k(λ∗)] ≤ ϕ∗k−1.
Then there is an agent l such that
ϕl [c∗ + ϕ∗k−1 + f k(λ∗); c∗, c∗, . . . , c∗, ϕ∗k−1, f k(λ∗)] ≥
c∗
k − 2 .
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Without loss of generality, assume that this agent is agent k − 2. Let
ϕ∗k−2 = ϕk−2[c∗ + ϕ∗k−1 + f k(λ∗); c∗, c∗, . . . , c∗, ϕ∗k−1, f k(λ∗)],
thus ϕ∗k−2 ≥ c
∗
k−2 .
Continuing the same way, at step i, consider the problem
[c∗ + ϕ∗i+1 + · · · + ϕ∗k−1 + f k(λ∗); c∗, c∗, . . . , c∗, ϕ∗i+1, . . . , ϕ∗k−1, f k(λ∗)].
Since
ϕk[c∗+ϕ∗i+1+. . .+ϕ∗k−1+ f k(λ∗); c∗, c∗, . . . , c∗, ϕ∗i+1, . . . , ϕ∗k−1, f k(λ∗)] ≤ f k(λ∗)
and
ϕ j [c∗ + ϕ∗i+1 + · · · + ϕ∗k−1 + f k(λ∗); c∗, c∗, . . . , c∗, ϕ∗i+1, . . . , ϕ∗k−1, f k(λ∗)] ≤ ϕ∗j ,
for j = k − 1, . . . i + 1. Then, there is an agent l such that
ϕl [c∗ + ϕ∗i+1 + · · · + ϕ∗k−1 + f k(λ∗); c∗, c∗, . . . , c∗, ϕ∗i+1, . . . , ϕ∗k−1, f k(λ∗)] ≥
c∗
i
.
Without loss of generality, assume that this agent is agent i. Let
ϕ∗i = ϕi [c∗ + ϕ∗i+1 + · · · + ϕ∗k−1 + f k(λ∗); c∗, c∗, . . . , c∗, ϕ∗i+1, . . . , ϕ∗k−1, f k(λ∗)].
Thus, ϕ∗i ≥ c
∗
i .
Consider the network in Fig. 13.
Since ϕ∗i ≥ c
∗
i for i = 1, . . . , k − 1 and ϕ∗k > c
∗
k , then the only equilibrium is
where agent i demands the link (si , t) with cost ϕ∗i . This equilibrium is inefficient and
has a cost equal to
∑k
i=1 ϕ∗i > H(k)(c∗ + 	), for small 	. unionsq
8.3 Any IR mechanism has a PoS at least H(k)
Proof We show by an example that any IR cost-sharing mechanism must have a PoS
of at least H(k). Consider a situation as shown in Fig. 14. Here, every agent i has
two strategies—either connect his demand nodes directly where the cost of the path
is 1/ i or connect through the path where link costs are 0 and 1 + 	. Consider any
arbitrary cost-sharing mechanism ξ that satisfies individual rationality. We will show
that if there exists an equilibrium, then this is where every agent is using his direct
path to t . We prove this by contradiction.
Case 1. Assume that all agents use a free link to v and then the common link of cost
1 + 	 to t. But then at least one of the agents must be paying more than 1/k. We
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Fig. 13 Optimality of the EG mechanism
Fig. 14 Incompatibility of EFF and IR
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assume that this agent is the kth agent in some configuration22 of the graph. Then,
he will have a profitable deviation to go to the direct link of cost 1/k under any IR
mechanism.
Case 2. Assume that s agents are using their direct link and k − s agents are sharing
the common link to v. Then, it follows from the individual rationality of the s agents
that at least one of the remaining k − s agents must be paying more than 1/(k − s).
Notice that in this case, there exists an unused direct link, say, s j → t , of cost 1/s j
which is at most 1/(k − s). Now in some configuration of the graph, agent j will be
the agent who is paying the above-mentioned amount of more than 1/(k − s) and thus
he would like to deviate.
We have just shown that no configuration different from the direct connection is
a NE. If the equilibrium exists, then it must be the direct connection and has a cost
equal to H(k), whereas the efficient graph has a cost equal to 1 + 	 (everyone uses
a costless link to node v and then the common link to t). As 	 goes to zero, the PoS
approaches to H(k).
Finally, if there is no equilibrium, then the PoS equals infinity. unionsq
8.4 Lower bound for PoS(PR)
Proof Consider the network as shown in Fig. 15. We show that the unique equilibrium
of the PR is of order k. Let the costs of links si → t be xi . Straightforward computations
show that the kth agent will deviate from the efficient graph of cost 1 + 	 if xk ≤
1−k+
√
(k−1)2+4k(k−1)
2k . As k grows, xk converges to the golden number
√
5−1
2 in contrast
to 1/k for the uniform mechanism, which goes to zero. Also xt−1 > xt for all t =
2, 3, . . . , k and x1 = 1. Thus, the lower bound on the PoS of the PR is ∑ki=1 xi , which
is of order k. unionsq
9 Other proofs
9.1 Proof of Proposition 2
The proof is very similar to the existence of a NE for an AEM in Lemma 2.
Consider the asymmetric EG ϕ generated by the functions f 1, . . . , f k .
Let si = minPi ∈Πi (N ) C(Pi ) be the stand-alone cost of agent i .
Let λi be the largest number such that f i (λi ) = si . Without loss of generality,
assume that λ1 ≤ λ2 ≤ · · · ≤ λk .
Consider a strategy profile T = (T 1, T 2, . . . , T k) and let t i = C(T i ) be the cost
of strategy T i . Let λ∗ be a solution to the system
∑
i min{t i , f i (λ∗)} = C(T ).
22 It is important to note that just one such configuration is enough, since PoS is a measure of the performance
of the best NE in the worst case example.
123
R. Juarez, R. Kumar
Fig. 15 PoS(PR) is of order k
We say that the strategy profile T is Nash-convergent if for every agent i : (a)
ϕi (T ) = si , or (b) ϕi (T ) = f i (λ∗) and λ∗ ≤ λi .
Step 1. Consider a Nash-convergent profile T . Suppose that coalition S has a deviation
Y S that weakly improves all agents in S and strictly improves agent j ∈ S. Then, the
profile (Y S, T −S) is also a Nash-convergent profile with smaller λ∗.
Proof We divide this step into steps 1.1 and 1.2.
Let λ˜ be the smallest solution to
∑
k∈S
min{yk, f k(λ˜)} +
∑
i ∈S
min{t i , f i (λ˜)} = C(Y S, T −S).
Step 1.1. The relation λ˜ < λ∗ holds.
Since T is Nash-convergent, then ϕ j (T ) = s j , or ϕ j (T ) = f j (λ∗) and λ∗ ≤ λi .
Case 1. ϕ j (T ) = s j .
Note that
min{t j , f j (λ∗)} = s j > min{y j , f j (λ˜)}.
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Since s j is the stand-alone cost of agent j , then y j ≥ s j . Therefore,
min{y j , f j (λ˜)} = f j (λ˜). Thus,
min{t j , f j (λ∗)} > f j (λ˜).
This implies, f j (λ∗) > f j (λ˜). By the monotonicity of f j , we have that λ∗ > λ˜.
Case 2. ϕ j (T ) = f j (λ∗) and λ∗ ≤ λi .
Note that
min{t j , f j (λ∗)} = f j (λ∗) > min{y j , f j (λ˜)}. (14)
We show that y j ≥ f j (λ˜). Indeed, assume the contrary, that is f j (λ˜) > y j . Then,
min{y j , f j (λ˜)} = y j . Thus, from Eq. 14,
f j (λ∗) > y j ≥ s j . (15)
Since λ j ≥ λ∗, then s j = f j (λ j ) ≥ f j (λ∗). This contradicts equation 15. There-
fore, y j ≥ f j (λ˜).
Now, we show that λ∗ > λ˜. Since y j ≥ f j (λ˜), then from Eq. 14, f j (λ∗) > f j (λ˜).
Thus, λ∗ > λ˜ by the monotonicity of f j .
Step 1.2. The profile (Y S, T −S) is Nash-convergent.
– First, we consider an agent i , where i ∈ S, that satisfies case (a). That is, ϕi (T ) =
min{t i , f i (λ∗)} = si .
Since λ∗ > λ˜, then
si = min{t i , f i (λ∗)} ≥ min{t i , f i (λ˜)}. (16)
If ϕi (Y S, T −S) = t i , then min{t i , f i (λ˜)} = t i . Therefore, by Eq. 16, si = t i .
Hence,
ϕi (Y S, T −S) = si .
On the other hand, if ϕi (Y S, T −S) = f i (λ˜), then min{t i , f i (λ˜)} = f i (λ˜). There-
fore, by Eq. 16, si ≥ f i (λ˜). Since si = f i (λi ), then f i (λi ) ≥ f i (λ˜). Hence,
λi ≥ λ˜ by the monotonicity of f i and because λi is the maximal value that satisfies
f i (λi ) = si .
– Second, we consider an agent i , where i ∈ S, that satisfies case (b) ϕi (T ) = f i (λ∗)
and λ∗ ≤ λi .
Since ϕi (T ) = f i (λ∗), then min{t i , f i (λ∗)} = f i (λ∗). Thus, t i ≥ f i (λ∗).
Also, note that f i (λ∗) ≥ f i (λ˜) because λ∗ > λ˜. Hence, t i ≥ f i (λ˜). Thus,
ϕi (Y S, T −S) = min{t i , f i (λ˜)} = f i (λ˜).
Since λ∗ ≤ λi and λ˜ ≤ λ∗, then λ˜ ≤ λi as desired.
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– Third, we consider the agent j ∈ S who changed his strategy. first note that because
the profile T is Nash-convergent, then
ϕ j (T ) ≤ s j .
This is obvious if agent j satisfies case a (in Nash-convergence definition). If agent
j satisfies case b, then ϕ j (T ) ≤ f j (λ∗) and λ∗ ≤ λ j . By the monotonicity of f j , we
have f j (λ∗) ≤ f j (λ j ). Therefore, ϕ j (T ) ≤ f j (λ j ) = s j .
Since agent j’s cost-share does not increase by deviating, then
ϕ j (Y S, T −S) ≤ ϕ j (T ) ≤ s j .
If ϕ j (Y S, T −S) = min{yS, f j (λ˜)} = y j , then y j ≤ s j . Since s j is the stand-alone
cost then s j ≤ y j . Therefore, y j = s j and case (a) is satisfied.
On the other hand, if ϕ j (Y S, T −S) = min{y j , f j (λ˜)} = f j (λ˜), then
f j (λ˜) ≤ s j = f j (λ j ).
Therefore λ˜ ≤ λ j by the monotonicity of f j and because λ j is the maximal value that
satisfies f j (λi ) = s j . Thus, case (b) is satisfied.
unionsq
Step 2. The equilibrium with the minimal cost is Nash-convergent.
Proof Consider the equilibrium with the minimal cost X. Let λ∗ is such that
∑
i
min{C(Xi ), f i (λ∗)} = C(X1, . . . , Xk).
By step 1 of Sect. 7.1, there exists an index m such that:
i. ϕi (X) = si for i = 1, . . . , m,
ii. ϕh(X) = f h(λ∗) for h > m, and
iii. λm < λ∗ ≤ λm+1.
If ϕi (X) = si , then case (a) holds.
If ϕi (X) = f i (λ∗), then λ∗ ≤ λi . Therefore, case (b) holds. unionsq
Step 3. Finally, we show the existence of equilibrium. Consider the better response
tatonnement where at every step a coalition of agents picks a path that weakly decrease
their cost-share of the deviating agents and strictly decrease the cost-share of at least
one of them. Then, the better response tatonement starting from the NE with the
minimal cost converges in a finite number of iterations. This is because at every step
the value λ∗ decreases, and there are a finite number of strategies. If the number of
steps is greater than zero, then the limit profile is a NE with a smaller λ. By step 2 of
Sect. 7.1, the equilibria are Pareto ranked and a smaller λ implies the equilibrium has
smaller cost. This is a contradiction.
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Fig. 16 Network illustrating
EG does not admit a potential
9.2 The game generated by EG does not admit an ordinal potential
Consider a network shown in Fig. 16 below. Here there are two agents, agent 1 and
agent 2, their demand nodes are {s1, t} and {s2, t}, respectively. Both agents have two
strategies each. One of the strategies of agent i (i = 1, 2) is to connect through the
direct link, i.e si → t , and her other strategy is to connect indirectly through the node
v, that is, si → v → t . We denote the two strategies of agent 1 as a and b and the two
strategies of agent 2 as c and d where a := s1 → v → t, b := s1 → t, c := s2 → t
and d := s2 → v → t . Given the EG mechanism, the game induced by the network
on the set of agents can be represented in normal form by the following matrix, where
agent 1 is the row player and agent 2 is the column player. The first number in each
cell of the matrix corresponds to the cost-share of agent 1, and the second number
corresponds to the cost-share of agent 2.
c d
a 3, 1.5 1.5, 1.5
b 2, 1.5 2, 1.5
Suppose that this is an ordinal potential game. Then, there must exist an ordinal
potential function P : {a, b}×{c, d} → R satisfying P(a, c) > P(b, c) = P(b, d) >
P(a, d) = P(a, c), which is impossible.
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